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A Proposal to Amend Rule of Evidence 404 To
Admit "Prior Acts" Evidence in Domestic Violence
Prosecutions
Corttany Brooks*
INTRODUCTION
One of the first things learned about Omar Mateen,
the gunman who killed forty-nine people in the 2016
Pulse nightclub shooting, was that he reportedly abused
his ex-wife.1 Similarly, Nikolas Cruz, the student charged
in the Parkland, Florida mass shooting, had a history of
domestic violence.2 Data on mass shootings from 2009 to
2015 reveal that “57 percent of the cases included a
spouse, former spouse or other family member among the
victims—and that 16 percent of the attackers had
previously been charged with domestic violence.”3 Studies
have yet to reveal what explains this correlation.4
However, one expert opines that domestic violence can
serve as a “psychological training ground” for more
serious attacks.5 One argument is that domestic violence
is more prevalent than people believe, and it often carries
lesser consequences for perpetrators than other kinds of
violence.

* Notes Editor, Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality, Volume
7; Indiana University Maurer School of Law, J.D. 2019; Ohio
University, B.S. 2015. I would like to thank the dedicated members of
the Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality for their feedback,
editing, and cite-checking, and my family and loved ones for their
support.
1 Amanda Taub, Control and Fear: What Mass Killings and Domestic
Violence Have in Common, N.Y. TIMES, The Interpreter, (June 15,
2016), https://www.nytimes.com/2016/06/16/world/americas/controland-fear-what-mass-killings-and-domestic-violence-have-incommon.html?module=inline.
2 Jose Pagliery and Curt Devine, School shooter showed violence and
mental instability at home, police reports reveal, CNN (February 17,
2018), https://www.cnn.com/2018/02/16/us/florida-shooter-cruzrecords-police-calls-to-home-invs/index.html.
3 Id.
4 Id.
5 Id.

182

Indiana Journal of Law and Social Equality [7:1

Individuals who use violence to control their
intimate partners routinely avoid criminal conviction due
to the difficulties of prosecuting domestic violence cases.6
This is because domestic violence creates a unique type of
prosecution where physical evidence may be lacking and
the victim often refuses to cooperate, recants, or is made
unavailable.7 Although prosecutors have found ways to
introduce evidence of prior domestic violence in limited
circumstances,8 Rule of Evidence 404 generally precludes
the use of evidence showing prior bad acts by defendants.9
In this note, I argue that this evidence rule prevents the
admission of highly probative evidence of prior abuse
against current or past victims that not only provides the
essential backdrop to understanding these cases—but also
can show a defendant’s propensity to batter. This note
proposes that the state of Indiana recognize the difficulty
in proving domestic violence cases and adopt a categorical
exception to the general prohibition on the admissibility
of prior acts evidence in domestic violence criminal
prosecutions.
This note proceeds in three parts. Part I provides
background and discusses the difficulties of prosecuting
domestic violence cases and the current admissibility of
evidence in Indiana domestic violence criminal
prosecutions. Part II discusses other approaches to the
general inadmissibility of character evidence under the
law, including California’s categorical exception for crimes
of domestic violence and the Federal Rules of Evidence
which have adopted exceptions for sexual offenses. Part
III argues for the application of these other approaches to
domestic violence prosecutions in Indiana.

See Part I, Section A.
See id.
8 See Part I, Section B, infra.
9 See id.
6
7
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DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
CHARACTER EVIDENCE UNDER THE LAW
A. The Difficulties with Prosecuting Domestic
Violence

Domestic violence occurs when one intimate
partner uses physical violence, coercion, threats,
intimidation, isolation, or emotional, sexual, or economic
abuse to maintain power and control over the other
intimate partner.10 There is no one physical act that
characterizes domestic violence11—punishable crimes
encompass a continuum of behaviors ranging from
domestic battery to criminal confinement, sexual abuse,
strangulation, and homicide.12 These crimes know no
economic, racial, ethnic, religious, age, or gender limits.13
Although male victims must be treated with the same
concern and respect as female victims, women are
statistically more likely to be abused, and the
consequences of the violence are more severe.14

See generally Dynamics of Abuse, NATIONAL COALITION AGAINST
DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, https://ncadv.org/dynamics-of-abuse (last visited
Oct. 17, 2018).
11 Notably, “[C]yberstalking is now a standard part of domestic abuse
in the U.S.” According to an NPR survey of domestic violence
shelters, 85% reported working with victims whose abusers tracked
them through GPS, and 75% reported abusers listening in on them
remotely using mobile apps. Aarti Shahani, Smartphones are Used to
Stalk, Control Domestic Abuse Victims, NPR (Sept. 15, 2014, 4:22
PM),
https://www.npr.org/sections/alltechconsidered/2014/09/15/346149979/
smartphones-are-used-to-stalk-control-domestic-abuse-victims.
12 See Dynamics of Abuse, supra note 10; see also IND. CODE § 35-42-21.3 (2017) (domestic battery), IND. CODE § 35-42-3-3 (2017) (criminal
confinement), IND. CODE §§ 35-42-4-1 to -9 (2017) (sex offenses), IND.
CODE § 35-42-2-9 (2017) (strangulation), IND. CODE § 35-42-1-1 (2017)
(murder).
13 See Dynamics of Abuse, supra note 10.
14 The economic effects of violence against women are enormous;
according to a CDC study commissioned by Congress to quantify
these effects, the cost of intimate partner violence (including physical
assault, rape, and stalking) “exceed[s] $5.8 billion each year, nearly
$4.1 billion of which is for direct medical and mental health care
10
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As women are victims in the majority of intimate
partner violence incidents with the abusers
predominately men, this is a gendered phenomenon. At
least one in three women experience physical or sexual
violence at the hands of an intimate partner, and half of
all murdered women are killed by a current or former
intimate partner.15 More than 90% of female intimate
partner rape and sexual violence survivors reported their
perpetrators as male.16
Moreover, although these crimes can and do occur
independently, they often occur jointly, committed by the
same perpetrator against the same victim.17 In order to
understand the dynamics of a particular case, it is
essential to understand the broader continuum of violence
in which these cases occur.18
Violence against women was not consistently
recognized as a social problem until attention was focused
by the feminist reformers of the 1970s.19 What was
previously dismissed by society as a “private matter”
became recognized as domestic and eventually expanded
to intimate partner violence.20 As social attitudes towards
services. The total costs of [intimate partner violence] also include
nearly $0.9 billion in lost productivity from paid work and household
chores for victims of nonfatal violence and $0.9 billion in lifetime
earnings lost by victims of [intimate partner homicide].” DEP’T
HEALTH & HUMAN SERV., COSTS OF INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE
AGAINST WOMEN IN THE UNITED STATES, 2 (2003).
15 U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, EXTENT, NATURE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF
INTIMATE PARTNER VIOLENCE: FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL
VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY, iii, 3, 10, 13 (2000).
16 CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION, NATIONAL INTIMATE
PARTNER AND SEXUAL VIOLENCE SURVEY 24 (2010).
17 See generally LENORE WALKER, THE BATTERED WOMAN (1979)
(discussing two components of Walker's battered woman syndrome
theory, the “cycle of violence” and “learned helplessness,” used to
explain the phenomenon of ongoing domestic violence).
18 See id.
19 See Aviva Orenstein, Sex, Threats, And Absent Victims: The
Lessons of Regina v. Bedingfield for Modern Confrontation and
Domestic Violence Cases, 79 FORDHAM L. REV. 115, 143 (2010).
20 See id. Beating one’s wife, known as the right of chastisement, was
long condoned by the common law. Yet, when the common law right
of chastisement was abolished, the case law developed doctrines that
continued effectively to shield domestic violence from public
intervention (e.g., marital privacy and inter-spousal tort immunity);
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family violence progressed, domestic violence became not
only a social problem, but also a crime.21 Before pressure
from activists, there were no battered women’s shelters or
rape crisis policies, no studies on the frequency of spousal
abuse or rape, and no discussion of sexual harassment in
the workplace.22 In the years that followed these
reformers, society has seen increased awareness of the
harm caused by intimate partner violence, lawsuits by
citizens against police departments for failure to protect
them from such violence,23 and “changing social attitudes
towards gender roles and the relationship between the
sexes.”24 Consequently, “domestic violence is now studied
by many disciplines (criminology, psychology, sociology,
gender studies, and law) and is treated much more
seriously by the legal system and by society as a whole.”25
Despite social progress, convictions for crimes
related to domestic violence are notoriously difficult to
secure. Part of the problem stems from “residual
patriarchal social attitudes about male prerogative [and]
women’s roles.”26 However, another aspect of the difficulty
of such prosecutions is lack of physical evidence27 or other

see also Reva B. Seigel, The Rule of Love: Wife Beating as Prerogative
and Privacy, 105 YALE L.J. 2117, 2150–70 (1996).
21 See Orenstein, supra note 19, at 143.
22 See DEBORAH L. RHODE, SPEAKING OF SEX: THE DENIAL OF GENDER
INEQUALITY 95 (1997).
23 Joan Zorza, The Criminal Law of Misdemeanor Domestic Violence,
1970–1990, 83 J. CRIM. L. & CRIMINOLOGY 46, 53–60 (1992). In the
70s and 80s major class action lawsuits were filed on behalf of battery
victims in California and New York. These suits resulted in
settlement or consent judgments incorporating new policies, including
pro-arrest mandates and efforts to inform victims of their right to
obtain civil protective orders and other available services.
24 Orenstein, supra note 19, at 143–44.
25 Orenstein, supra note 19, at 143–44 (discussing additional
resources for law enforcement and survivors that became available
under the Violence Against Women Act in 1994, codified in part at 42
U.S.C. §§ 13701–14040).
26 Orenstein, supra note 19, at 144.
27 Many domestic violence victims forgo medical treatment either
because of the abuser’s demands or because of their own
embarrassment; when they do seek medical attention, they often lie
about the cause of their injuries. PATRICIA TJADEN & NANCY
THOENNES, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, FULL REPORT OF THE PREVALENCE,
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witnesses and, particularly, the fact that victims often do
not cooperate. They regularly recant, refuse to testify or to
appear for depositions, or simply ignore court-ordered
subpoenas.28 The reasons behind these actions are diverse
and complicated. A victim of intimate partner violence
may still love the perpetrator and may not want to get
him in trouble.29 Alternatively, the victim may feel
ashamed and be unwilling to testify about abuse that she
likely blames on herself.30 Victims regularly fear that they
might lose their children or the ability to care for their
children because the batterer is their only source of
housing or income.31 Further, the victim may fear the
accused and distrust the legal system’s ability to protect
them from, not only the abuser, but from the abuser’s
family and friends.32 Because domestic violence is rooted
in a desire to control, survivors confront an increased risk
when they attempt to leave their abuser—in fact, the
moment when a survivor attempts to end the relationship
is often the most dangerous.33
Although it is sometimes simpler to discuss persons
“of color” as if they constituted a single category, racial
and ethnic differences can have disparate impact on the
recorded occurrences of domestic violence. Although 12%
of the population, African Americans are almost one
quarter of spousal homicide victims and almost half (48%)
of the victims of homicide by a dating partner.34 Further
complicating the effect of domestic violence on this
community, African Americans can be suspicious of the
justice system and unwilling to participate in a system

INCIDENCE, AND CONSEQUENCES OF VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN:
FINDINGS FROM THE NATIONAL VIOLENCE AGAINST WOMEN SURVEY 9,
14 (2000) (discussing survey results the National Violence Against
Women Survey, herein “NVAWS”).
28 See Orenstein, supra note 19, at 144.
29 See id.
30 See id.
31 See id.
32 See id.
33 See id. at 145; see also Martha R. Mahoney, Legal Images of
Battered Women: Redefining the Issues of Separation, 90 MICH. L.
REV. 1, 58 (1991).
34 FAMILY VIOLENCE STATISTICS ON STRANGERS AND ACQUAINTANCES,
U.S. DEPT. OF JUSTICE tbl.3.2 (2005).
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that has historically treated Black males
discriminatorily.35 Latinas are particularly vulnerable to
domestic violence, for reasons that include limited
English proficiency, lower levels of educational
achievement, uncertain immigration, and
overrepresentation in low-paying jobs.36 Like African
American women, Latinas are often suspicious of police,
prosecutors, and judges, who may be culturally distant
from the community and have acted repressively toward
it in the past.37
In terms of social costs, every time a survivor goes
to court, they must take time off from work, find childcare
for children if they are not in school, miss opportunities,
lose money, and go through the traumatic experience of
retelling their story again and again.
Further complicating these cases is the criminal
law’s incident-based approach to defining unlawful
behavior, which is ill-suited to redress the ongoing,
patterned nature of battering.38 Abusive behavior does
not occur as a series of discrete events—a more accurate
description of domestic violence is “premised on an
understanding of coercive behavior of power and control”
that takes place on a continuum.39 Because criminal
prosecution is one of the few processes that can interrupt
this escalation pattern unique to domestic violence, we
must be willing to look at patterned behavior during the

See, e.g., Kimberle Crenshaw, Mapping the Margins:
Intersectionality, Identity Politics, and Violence Against Women of
Color, 43 STAN. L. REV. 1241, 1253–65 (1993).
36 See Michelle DeCasas, Protecting Hispanic Women: The Inadequacy
of Domestic Violence Policy, 24 CHI-LATINO L. REV. 56 (2003).
37 See Jenny Rivera, Domestic Violence Against Latinas by Latino
Males: An Analysis of Race, National Origin, and Gender
Differentials, 14 B.C. THIRD WORLD L.J. 231, 246–50 (1994). Note that
it is outside the scope of this Article’s purpose to explore all the
diverse reasons as to why individuals might remain in abusive
relationships. That said, it is significant to point out that much of the
academic community continues to ask that same question, focusing
on the victims of domestic violence, instead of on the batterers.
38 See Deborah Tuerkheimer, Recognizing and Remedying the Harm
of Battering: A Call to Criminalize Domestic Violence, 94 J. CRIM. L. &
CRIMINOLOGY 959, 964 (2004).
39 Id. at 965.
35
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criminal prosecution, or we neglect our opportunity to
effectively address the problem at all.
B. The Current Scheme of Admissibility of Evidence
in Domestic Violence Cases: Crawford through
Character
Many prosecutors, facing the reality that victims
regularly do not cooperate, can use strategic lawyering to
prosecute “victimless” cases.40 However, such prosecution
policy depends heavily upon the admissibility of the
victim’s out-of-court hearsay statements to police and 911
operators.41
The Sixth Amendment to the Constitution provides
that in criminal prosecutions the accused shall enjoy the
right “to be confronted with the witnesses against him.”42
The Supreme Court has interpreted this clause as
providing various guarantees to criminal defendants,
including the right to face-to-face presentation of
witnesses at trial.43 The Confrontation Clause and
hearsay doctrine have intertwined rules and purposes
(some evidence that would be admitted under a hearsay
rule may be excluded by the Confrontation Clause, and
evidence that would be admitted under the Confrontation
Clause may be excluded by a hearsay rule).44
In the seminal Confrontation Clause case Crawford
v. Washington, the Supreme Court held that the Sixth

This note is written under the premise of no-drop prosecution
policies, which I have experienced working in Marion County,
Indiana. “Evidence-based” prosecutions are those in which “the
victim's testimony [is] no longer the sole or primary source of
evidence,” and “no-drop” prosecutions proceed regardless of a victim's
cooperation. ELIZABETH M. SCHNEIDER, CHERYL HANNA, JUDITH G.
GREENBERG & CLARE DALTON, DOMESTIC VIOLENCE AND THE LAW:
THEORY AND PRACTICE 39 (2d ed. 2008). This Note does not seek to
address the effectiveness of these policies herein.
41 Sources of evidence may include: calls from inmates to their victims
(“jail calls”), 911 calls, photographs, body and in-car videos, excited
utterances (IND. R. EVID. 803 (2)), and statements for medical
treatment (IND. R. EVID. 803(4)).
42 U.S. CONST. amend. VI.
43 Coy v. Iowa, 487 U.S. 1012, 1016 (1988).
44 See generally Crawford v. Washington 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
40
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Amendment requires two showings to introduce a
“testimonial” out of court statement into evidence against
a criminal defendant: (1) the unavailability of the witness,
and (2) the prior opportunity to cross-examine the
witness,45 overturning a long line of jurisprudence,
including Ohio v. Roberts.46 Numerous articles followed
discussing Crawford, often finding the defining of
“testimonial” statements a difficult and unbalanced
task.47 In Indiana and across the United States this
opinion further impeded the prosecution of domestic
violence cases, where victims are often unavailable for
cross-examination due to the many reasons
aforementioned in Part I, Section A.
The customary tools of introducing hearsay
statements in domestic violence prosecutions through
hearsay exceptions have become severely limited. For
example, after Davis v. Washington, a post-Crawford
decision by the U.S. Supreme Court, if a prosecutor wants
to admit evidence of a recording of a 911 call when the
witness is not available for cross-examination, the
statement must be made when an ongoing emergency is
present.48 If the statement becomes a narrative and is
more akin to the victim “testifying” rather than seeking
help, the statement cannot be admitted.49 While portions
of 911 calls can still be admitted into evidence under
Davis, many recordings are excluded if a judge finds the
emergency ended.50 Further, in Hammon v. Indiana, the
U.S. Supreme Court held that when a responding officer
arrives, if there is no ongoing emergency, the statements

Id. at 68.
See 448 U.S. 56, 65 (1980) (finding a two-part interpretation of the
Confrontation Clause as it applies to admission of hearsay: (1) the
rule of necessity, and (2) the rule of reliability).
47 See David Crump, Overruling Crawford v. Washington: Why and
How, 88 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 115, 117 (2012) (showing that scholars
have found the decision “generally uncomplimentary, featuring
descriptions ranging from ‘unstable’ to ‘unspeakable’”).
48 See 547 U.S. 813, 822–23 (2006).
49 See id.
50 See id.
45
46
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made to the responding officer are testimonial.51 This
means that any statement made to an officer who is
investigating a crime rather than responding to a call for
help will be held inadmissible if the victim is
subsequently excluded as a witness.52
In addition to these cases, current Indiana evidence
law generally prohibits the introduction of a defendant’s
past acts of domestic violence.53 This prohibition affects
domestic violence prosecutions because domestic violence
is a highly recidivistic crime,54 and such rules prevent the
admission of highly probative evidence of prior abuse
against victims that provides essential context to cases
and tends to show a defendant’s propensity to batter. The
Crawford decision and subsequent cases,55 paired with
Indiana evidence law banning a defendant's prior acts of
domestic violence admission into evidence, limit the tools
available to prosecutors in already difficult domestic
violence prosecutions, which can tip the balance at trial in
favor of the defendant.
The admission of prior acts is governed by Indiana
Rule of Evidence 404(b), which tracks Federal Rule of
Evidence 404(b) almost verbatim.56 The Indiana rule
provides, in relevant part, that “[e]vidence of a crime,

Id. at 822 (reversing Hammon v. State, 829 N.E.2d 444 (Ind.
2005)).
52 See Crawford v. State, 541 U.S. 36 (2004).
53 IND. R. EVID. 404(b).
54 See generally Edward W. Gondolf, A 30-Month Follow-Up of CourtReferred Batterers in Four Cities, 44 J. OFFENDER THERAPY & COMP.
CRIMINOLOGY 111 (2000). Nearly two-thirds (61%) of domestic
violence recidivism occurred within six months of the previous
offence, with slightly more than one-third (37%) of the repeat
victimization occurring within three months. Recidivism occurs
sooner following the previous offence when using self-reported data
compared to data collected from official criminal justice statistics.
55 See Crawford, 541 U.S. 36; see also Clark v. State, 808 N.E.2d 1183,
1189 n.2 (Ind. 2004) (noting that Crawford is inapplicable where the
declarant testifies at trial); but see Fowler v. State, 829 N.E.2d 459,
464 (Ind. 2005) (affirming that a statement given to police who
arrived at the scene and began informally questioning those around
while the victim is still bleeding and crying from domestic violence
was not testimonial and the evidence fell under the excited utterance
exception and outside the Supreme Court’s decision in Crawford).
56 IND. R. EVID. 404(b); cf. FED. R. EVID. 404(b).
51
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wrong, or other act is not admissible to prove a person's
character in order to show that on a particular occasion
the person acted in accordance with the character.”57
Evidence of prior acts may, however, be admissible for
other purposes, such as proof of “motive, opportunity,
intent, preparation, plan, knowledge, identity, absence of
mistake, or lack of accident.”58 Rule 404(b)’s list of
permissible purposes is illustrative but not exhaustive.59
When assessing the admissibility of 404(b)
evidence, Indiana courts currently: (1) determine whether
the evidence of other crimes or wrongs is relevant to a
matter at issue—other than the defendant’s propensity to
commit the charged crime; and (2) then balance the
probative value of the evidence against its prejudicial
effect pursuant to Ind. R. Evid. 403.60 Notably, the
Supreme Court of Indiana has repeatedly held that a
defendant’s prior acts of violence or threats of violence are
“usually admissible” under Rule 404(b) to show the
relationship between the defendant and the victim, and to
show the defendant’s motive where the charge is battery
or murder.61

IND. R. EVID. 404(b).
Id.
59 See Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 220–21 (Ind. 1997).
60 See id.; see also IND. R. EVID. 403 (“The court may exclude relevant
evidence if its probative value is substantially outweighed by a
danger of one or more of the following: unfair prejudice, confusing the
issues, misleading the jury, undue delay, or needlessly presenting
cumulative evidence.”).
61 E.g., Hicks v. State, 690 N.E.2d 215, 222 (Ind. 1997). See also, e.g.,
Spencer v. State, 703 N.E.2d 1053, 1056 (Ind. 1999) (holding that the
state’s introduction of three prior batteries by defendant against the
victim was not an abuse of discretion of the trial court to prove
identity and motive); Ross v. State, 676 N.E.2d 339, 346 (Ind. 1996)
(explaining defendant’s prior acts are usually admissible to show the
relationship between the defendant and the victim in cases of
murder); Elliott v. State, 630 N.E.2d 202, 204 (Ind. 1994) (finding
appellant’s prior threats and statements concerning the victim
admissible to show the relationship between the parties and
appellant's motive, plan, and absence of accident); Price v. State, 619
N.E.2d 582, 584 (Ind. 1993) (finding evidence of defendant’s prior
attacks upon the victim was admissible to show the parties’
relationship and defendant’s motive and intent in the commission of
the crime).
57
58
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For example, in Iqbal v. State, the trial court
allowed use of bad acts (a violent relationship with the
victim) occurring within one year of the victim’s death to
be introduced, although the State had evidence dating
back several years.62 In this case, “the evidence was
relevant to show motive, relationship between the parties,
and absence of mistake.”63 The court found that the trial
court had properly balanced the prejudicial effect of the
prior acts against the probative value by limiting the
prior acts which could be introduced to those occurring
within one year of the murder.64
Further, the Indiana Supreme Court allowed the
admission of prior act evidence when defendants claimed
the victim’s death was accidental. In Crain v. State, the
Court allowed the admission the defendant's two
convictions for battery against his wife, in addition to
evidence of four charges against the defendant for
battering his wife that were pending at the time of her
death.65 In light of the defendant's claim that he
accidentally killed his wife, the Court found these
instances of prior act evidence admissible under Rule
404(b) because each was “relevant and probative in that it
directly involved and shed light on Defendant's
relationship with [the victim].”66 Moreover, in McEwen v.
State, evidence of the defendant’s previous battery against
the victim was admissible under Rule 404(b).67 The Court
stated “[The prior act evidence] was relevant to show a
pattern of hostility . . . illustrated the depth of possible
motive and was also relevant to assessing [the
defendant’s] claim that [the victim] was stabbed
accidentally.”
Any incident of prior act evidence is nonetheless
excluded if its probative value is substantially outweighed
by the danger of unfair prejudice.68 While these examples

805 N.E.2d 401, 405 (Ind. Ct. App. 2004).
Id. at 408.
64 Id. at 408–09.
65 736 N.E.2d 1223, 1235 (Ind. 2000).
66 Id. at 1235–36 (citing Evans v. State, 727 N.E.2d 1072, 1080 (Ind.
2000)).
67 695 N.E.2d 79, 87–88 (Ind. 1998).
68 See generally IND. R. EVID. 403.
62
63
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show Indiana is willing to admit prior acts evidence for
certain purposes, these are often the most gruesome
batteries and murders. In application, even where victims
do cooperate, their testimony is limited to the discrete
incident(s) for which the defendant is charged, and any
past incidents that would provide context are excluded for
the fear that the information will lead to the 404(b)
forbidden inference.69 Current approaches do, however,
indicate that Indiana courts may be willing to take that
next step towards a categorical exception for domestic
violence cases.
C. Problems with the Current Scheme: Why
Indiana, Why Now?
Despite increased statewide attention to the
problem of domestic violence in Indiana,70 reported
incidents are only increasing. Year-to-year crisis calls are
on the rise—from about 16,500 in 2010 to 23,000 in 2015
for central Indiana alone—an average of nearly fifteen
calls every minute.71 Another side of the problem that has
received less attention is that most cases of domestic
violence are unreported—indicating that reported cases of
domestic violence represent only a small part of the
problem when compared with prevalent data.72

See generally IND. R. EVID. 404(b).
For example, the Indianapolis Metropolitan Police Department’s
(IMPD) predictive policing initiative, Baker One, is a “proactive
approach to policing that involves identifying individuals at risk for
perpetrating domestic violence, providing these individuals with
increased access to supportive services, and promoting a heightened
system response for incidents involving these individuals.” DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE NETWORK, STATE OF DOMESTIC VIOLENCE IN CENTRAL
INDIANA, 17 (2016).
71 Id. at tbl.1. For the purposes of this report, Central Indiana is
defined as Marion County and the eight surrounding counties: Boone,
Hamilton, Hancock, Hendricks, Johnson, Madison, Morgan, and
Shelby.
72JENNIFER TRUMAN, LYNN LANGTON, & MICHAEL PLANTY, OFFICE OF
JUSTICE PROGRAMS, U.S. DEP’T OF JUSTICE, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION
2012, tbl.4 (2012). From 2003 to 2012, only about 55% of domestic
violence was reported to police.
69
70
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According to one report, “between 2009 and 2010,
116 women, children, and men died in Indiana when
domestic abuse escalated to lethal levels of violence.”73
Domestic violence deaths were reported in only 38 of
Indiana’s 92 counties, so these numbers are not
representative for the entire state.74 The youngest
identified victim was a seven-month-old baby and the
eldest was an 80-year-old senior.75 Ninety-one percent of
homicides attributed to domestic violence during this
period were perpetrated by men.76 Charges were pursued
against perpetrators in 52 of the 85 identified incidents.77
Lastly, of the 52 incidents that resulted in charges, 42
perpetrators were convicted.78
By comparison, in 2013, the Marion County
Prosecutor’s Office reviewed 5,581 domestic violence
cases.79 Of the cases where charges were filed (both
felonies and misdemeanors), 59% were dismissed.80 In my
experience working at this office as a domestic violence
and sex crimes intern, nearly all dismissed cases are due
to lack of victim cooperation.
Separately, in an Indiana crime victimization
survey, respondents were asked questions about domestic
violence including various types of physical violence,
threats of violence, frequency of violence, whether any of

INDIANA DOMESTIC VIOLENCE FATALITY REVIEW REPORT 2009-2010,
INDIANA COALITION AGAINST DOMESTIC VIOLENCE (herein “ICADV”),
1.
74 Id. at 5. Indiana does not have a system for collecting data related
to domestic violence homicides. The ICADV contacted coroners, law
enforcement, and shelters to request relevant records. These requests
for records received approximately a 60% response rate.
75 Id. at 1.
76 Id. at 9.
77 Id. at 13 (“[C]harges were irrelevant in cases where the perpetrator
committed suicide and were not brought against individuals
determined to be taking defensive or protective action.”).
78 Id. at 14 (“[T]hree were found not guilty, sentencing was unknown
for three cases, three trials were still pending at the time of
publication[,] and one alleged perpetrator died in incarceration prior
to trial.”).
79 DOMESTIC VIOLENCE NETWORK, AN UPDATE ON DOMESTIC VIOLENCE
IN THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE SYSTEM: MARION COUNTY, IN, 31 (Nov.
2014).
80 Id.
73
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the incidents were reported to police, and, if not, why the
crime was not reported.81 Of the 2,500 survey
participants, 1.8% indicated they were victims of domestic
violence in the last year.82 When applying this figure to
the adult population, the potential number of Indiana
domestic violence victims is 87,759 during the 12-month
survey period.83
Though not fully representative, the numbers
between potential crimes committed, crimes charged, and
charges that resulted in meaningful sentences are
unconscionable.84 National statistics similarly reveal
under-reporting, under-enforcement, and inadequacy of
punishment in domestic violence prosecutions that lead to
conviction.85 Moreover, researchers have indicated that
current penalties are not effective in the reduction of
recidivism.86 Studies also reveal simple prosecution does
not deter further criminal abuse.87 The key to reducing reabuse is dependent upon the sentence imposed (for
example, intrusive sentences, such as jail, work release,
electronic monitoring and/or probation reduce recidivism
in domestic violence cases).88 Fines and suspended

INDIANA CRIMINAL JUSTICE INSTITUTE, 2010 INDIANA CRIMINAL
VICTIMIZATION SURVEY: SEXUAL ASSAULT AND DOMESTIC VIOLENCE, 4
(2012).
82 Id. at tbl.2. Domestic violence in the survey was defined as a slap,
punch, kick or push; hitting with an object; using a weapon;
threatening with violence or to kill survey respondents.
83 Id.
84 This Note acknowledges the difference between charged crimes of
domestic violence and overall potential domestic violence incidents,
however, the goal of this section is to provide statistics on the scope of
this issue in Indiana. See supra note 73.
85 See generally SHANNON M. CATALANO, U.S. DEP’T OF JUST., BUREAU
OF JUST. STATISTICS, CRIMINAL VICTIMIZATION SURVEY (2003).
86 See generally Tamika L. Payne, Domestic Violence Recidivism:
Restorative Justice Intervention Programs for First Time Domestic
Violence Offenders, WALDEN DISSERTATIONS AND DOCTORAL STUD. 4
(2017).
87 See generally Domestic Violence Best Practices, Indiana
Prosecuting Attorney’s Counsel (herein “IPAC”), available at
https://www.in.gov/ipac/files/5__DV_Best_Practices_PPP_for_December_10_2014_Suzanne_Karen_a
nd_Jeff(1).ppt.
88 Id.
81
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sentences without probation resulted in higher re-arrest
rates.89 Nonetheless, cornered by the unavailability of
evidence, prosecutors must dispose of many domestic
violence cases by plea agreements to probation and
suspended sentences.90
There is an epidemic of violence against women,
and Indiana is no different. To more fully combat
domestic violence, we must convince lawmakers to adopt
rules so that the way Indiana criminalizes domestic
violence reflects the realities of the crime.
II.

OTHER APPROACHES TO THE ADMISSIBILITY OF
CHARACTER EVIDENCE UNDER THE LAW
A. Introduction

To overcome the unique hurdles of prosecuting
domestic cases, a few states have authorized admission of
evidence of prior acts of domestic violence for propensity
purposes. Other states, including Indiana, have expanded
the availability of non-propensity theories for admitting
evidence of prior acts of domestic violence. Further, the
Federal Rules of Evidence (FRE) have created exceptions
for admitting specific instances of prior conduct in sexual
assault and child molestation cases for many of the same
reasons discussed herein.
Since 1997, California Evidence Code (CEC) section
1109 has provided for admission of evidence of prior acts
for propensity purposes where the defendant is charged
with a crime of domestic violence.91 The trial court has
discretion, however, to exclude such evidence if its
probative value is substantially outweighed by undue
prejudice.92 That same year, the Alaska legislature took a
similar step. Alaska Rule of Evidence 404(b) provides that
in “a prosecution for a crime involving domestic violence .
. . evidence of other crimes involving domestic violence by
the defendant against the same or another person . . . is

Id.
Id.
91 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109.
92 See CAL. EVID. CODE § 352.
89
90
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admissible.”93 Both states provide procedural safeguards
for defendants. In addition to the required balancing of
probative value and prejudice, the other acts evidence
must be: less than ten years old, similar to the charged
offense, and have been committed against persons similar
to the victim in the charged case.94 Both rules have
withstood due process and equal protection challenges.95
Additionally, other states—including Colorado,
Minnesota, and Kansas—have expanded the nonpropensity theories under which evidence of other acts of
domestic violence may be admitted.96 For example,
Minnesota’s statute has been interpreted to allow
evidence of the history of the relationship between the
victim and the defendant to explain the context in which
the charged assault occurred.97
The ban on character evidence began to erode in
sexual assault cases by judge-made law.98 To codify these
common law exceptions, in 1994 Congress passed FRE
413 (sexual assault), 414 (child molestation), and 415
(civil cases involving sexual assault or child
molestation).99 In criminal prosecutions for sexual assault
or child molestation, FRE 413 and FRE 414 supersede
FRE 404’s general prohibition to allow other victims of

ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b).
ALASKA R. EVID. 404(b)(2).
95 See, e.g., People v. Johnson, 91 Cal. Rptr. 2d 596, (2000) (due
process); People v. Jennings, 97 Cal. Rptr. 2d 727 (2000) (equal
protection); Allen v. State, 945 P.2d 1233 (Alaska Ct. App. 1997)
(involving a due process challenge to a different provision); Fuzzard v.
State, 13 P.3d 1163 (Alaska Ct. App. 2000) (equal protection).
96 See Andrea M. Kovach, Prosecutorial Use of Other Acts of Domestic
Violence for Propensity Purposes: A Brief Look at its Past, Present,
and Future, 2003 U. ILL. L. REV. 1115, 1144–48 (2003).
97 See State v. Waino, 611 N.W.2d 575, 579 (Minn. Ct. App. 2000).
98 Indiana was one of many states that created a common law lustful
disposition rule, although in Indiana it was termed the depraved
sexual instinct exception and remains law today. See Lannan v. State,
600 N.E.2d 1334, 1335 (Ind. 1992) (discussing the “long settled”
depraved sexual instinct exception in Indiana); see also Crabtree v.
State, 547 N.E.2d 286, 288–89 (Ind. Ct. App. 1989) (discussing many
of the ways in which the depraved sexual instinct exception had been
used in Indiana).
99 See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE § 186 (John W. Strong ed., 5th ed.
1999).
93
94
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sexual assault or child molestation to testify in cases
where the instant victim has been sexually assaulted or
molested by the defendant100—clearly contradicting the
character evidence prohibition.101 The experiences in
these states and under the Federal Rules offer guidance
on whether and how to amend our own rules.102
B. The Federal Rules of Evidence Expansion of
Prior Acts: Evidence Rulings in the Sexual
Assault and Child Sexual Abuse Contexts
FRE 404 controls character evidence and its
admission into court.103 The first part of FRE 404(b)
states that “[e]vidence of a crime, wrong, or other act is
not admissible to prove a person’s character in order to
show that on a particular occasion the person acted in
accordance with the character.”104 The second part of FRE
404(b) allows admission of evidence of other crimes or acts
for different purposes, “such as proving motive,
opportunity, intent, preparation, plan, knowledge,
identity, absence of mistake, or lack of accident.”105 FRE
413 and 414 allow the admission of “prior convictions,
similar specific instances[,] or even testimony of previous
allegations or uncharged actions” when a defendant is
accused of sexual assault or molestation.106
The rationale behind these rules is that character
evidence of the defendant’s propensity to commit acts of
child molestation or sexual assault is highly probative
and will enhance the likelihood of an accurate verdict,
unless deemed too prejudicial on other grounds.107 Thus,
its supporters argue, FRE 413 and 414 support the
premise of the FRE, which is “to secure fairness in
administration . . . and promotion of growth and

FED. R. EVID. 413(a), 414(a).
See MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 99, at § 190.
102 Indiana has not adopted equivalents of FRE 413, 414, or 415. See
Lannon, 600 N.E. 2d at 98; see also Crabtree, 547 N.E. 2d at 288-89.
103 FED. R. EVID. 404.
104 Id. at 404(b)(1).
105 Id. at 404(b)(2).
106 MCCORMICK ON EVIDENCE, supra note 98, at 650.
107 Kovach, supra note 96, at 1122–23.
100
101
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development of the law of evidence to the end that the
truth may be ascertained and proceedings justly
determined.”108
Proponents of FRE 413 and 414 also argue that
“sexual assault [and child molestation] cases are often
difficult to prove because of the unique circumstances of
these cases.”109 For instance, sexual assault cases are
challenging to prosecute because they typically involve
“he said, she said” testimony between the victims and
defendants.110 Thus, other acts evidence allowed under
FRE 413 of the defendant’s other sexual assaults may
bolster the instant victim’s credibility and lessen the
chance of a not guilty verdict.111 Finally, supporters
assured that FRE 413 and FRE 414 contained adequate
safeguards for the defendant’s procedural rights.112
The concern, on the other hand, is that character
evidence might allow the jury to infer—based solely on
prior acts evidence—that because the defendant
possessed the traits and capacity to commit a crime once,
the same defendant committed the same crime on this
occasion, and is, therefore, deserving of a guilty verdict.113
The motivation behind the ban on character evidence
stems from this fear that its admission prejudices
defendants and hinders their right to a fair trial. The
reliability of this type of inference by the jury has been

Id. at 1123 (citing FED. R. EVID. 102).
See id.
110 See id.
111 See id.
112 See David J. Karp, Evidence of Propensity and Probability in Sex
Offense Cases and Other Cases, 70 CHI.-KENT L. REV. 15, 21–24
(1994) (discussing such procedural safeguards as pretrial disclosure;
FRE 403’s balancing test still must be applied; FRE 413 is not
mandatory and still requires that the uncharged act be similar to the
charged offense; assistance of counsel; right to cross-examination of
witnesses and to present rebuttal evidence).
113 FED. R. EVID. 404 Advisory Committee’s Note (1973). The
circumstantial use of character evidence is generally questionable
because it requires the trier of fact to make an inference that the
defendant acted in accordance with that character at the time in
question. Id.
108
109
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doubted.114 While this is a fundamental concern,
exceptions to these rules have highlighted the significance
of balancing defendants’ rights not only against victims’
rights but against legitimate public policy concerns.
C. California’s Expansion of the Admissibility of
Prior Domestic Violence Acts
California’s rule admitting other acts of domestic
violence for propensity purposes is CEC section 1109.115
Under this section, prosecutors may admit defendants’
uncharged acts of domestic violence in their case in

Lindsay Gochnour, Sticks and Stones May Break My Bones, but
Words Will Always Hurt Me: Why California Should Expand the
Admissibility of Prior Acts of Child Abuse, 43 PEPP. L. REV. 417, 424
(2016) (“Both psychology and legal scholars have questioned the
validity of such an inference over the decades following the adoption
of the general rule.”).
115 CAL. EVID. CODE § 1109. This section reads as follows: Section
1109. Evidence of defendant’s other acts of domestic violence.
(a)(1) Except as provided in subdivision (e) or (f), in a criminal
action in which the defendant is
accused of an offense involving
domestic violence, evidence of the defendant’s commission of
other domestic violence is not made inadmissible by Section
1101 if the evidence is not
inadmissible pursuant to Section 352.
[...]
(b) In an action in which evidence is to be offered under this
section, the people shall disclose the
evidence to the defendant, including statements of witnesses
or a summary of the substance of
any testimony that is expected to be offered, in compliance
with the provisions of Section 1054.7
of the Penal Code.
(c) This section shall not be construed to limit or preclude the
admission or consideration of evidence under any other statute or
case law.
(d) As used in this section, “domestic violence” has the
meaning set forth in Section 13700 of the
Penal Code. “Abuse of an elder or a dependent adult” has the
meaning set forth in Section
15610.07 of the Welfare and Institutions Code.
(e) Evidence of acts occurring more than 10 years before the
charged offense is inadmissible under
this section, unless the court determines that the admission of
this evidence is in the interest of justice.
114
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chief116 for propensity purposes.117 The rule is applicable
to “prior acts of domestic violence against either the same
victim or different victims.”118 The rule’s definition of
domestic violence provides “intentionally or recklessly
cause or attempt to cause bodily injury, or which place
another person in reasonable apprehension of imminent
serious bodily injury to himself or herself, or another”—
capturing a number of domestic violence behaviors.119
In California, the Penal Code and subsequent case
law explains why special attention should be devoted to
the prosecution of batterers:
[I]n domestic violence cases evidence of prior
acts is particularly probative in
demonstrating the propensity of the
defendant . . . because on-going violence and
abuse is the norm in domestic violence cases.
Not only is there a great likelihood that any
one battering episode is part of a larger
scheme of dominance and control, that
scheme usually escalates in frequency and
severity. Without the propensity inference,
the escalating nature of domestic violence is
likewise masked.120
CEC 1109 was reasoned necessary by the legislature
because the ban on propensity evidence in domestic
violence cases “insulates defendants and misleads jurors
into believing that the charged offense was an isolated

See Kovach, supra note 96, at 1133 (citing People v. Poplar, 83 Cal.
Rptr. 2d 320, 324–25 (Cal. Ct. App. 1999)).
117 See id.
118 See id. (citing People v. Brown, 92 Cal. Rptr. 2d 433, 437–38 (Cal.
Ct. App. 2000)).
119 See id., at 1133–34 (citing CAL. PENAL CODE § 13700 (a)–(b)).
120 See, e.g., People v. Cabrera, 152 Cal. App. 4th 695 (2007)
(upholding the constitutionality of CAL. EVID. CODE, § 1109)
(“Admission of evidence of prior acts of domestic violence under Evid.
Code, § 1109 is subject to the limitations of Evid. Code, § 352. Pen.
Code, § 1109, subd. (a). This safeguard should ensure that § 1109
does not violate the Due Process Clause.”).
116
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incident, an accident, or a mere fabrication.”121 As such, it
was enacted to provide a more accurate picture of the
defendant’s behavior to the jury.122 Further, this
exception recognizes ongoing abuse as part of a larger
scheme of power and control—which usually escalates in
frequency and severity over time.123
Following the enactment of these rules, researchers
conducted surveys and interviews with California
prosecutors that revealed CEC section 1109 has proved
“invaluable in convicting recidivistic batterers.”124 This
research also revealed that the use of prior acts evidence
for propensity purposes “assists jurors enormously in
their decision-making process by showing that a person
with a history of battering is likely to have battered in the
current offense.”125 This evidence, typically in the form of
victim testimony, also provides strong corroboration.126
One prosecutor responded that a defendant sounds
“‘incredibly foolish’ when arguing that the victim attacked
him or fabricated the story when the prosecution is able to
call prior domestic violence victims as witnesses to
support the instant victim.”127
Proponents of CEC section 1109 hypothesized that
former domestic violence victims would be more willing to
testify because they are less likely to still fear the
defendant.128 This prediction proved true in some reported
instances where past victims testified and afterwards felt
empowered.129 However, interviews also revealed a
reluctance by prior victims to testify for current
victims.130 The reasons for this, again, are complicated

Kovach, supra note 96, at 1136.
Id.
123 Id.
124 Id. at 1138.
125 Id.
126 See id.
127 Id.
128 Id. at 1139.
129 Id.
130 See id.
121
122
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and varied.131 Another hurdle for prosecutors has been
locating these prior victims.132
Nonetheless, CEC section 1109 is a landmark
evidentiary tool for prosecutors seeking convictions in
domestic violence cases and a potential model for
amending our own rules.
III.

APPLYING OTHER APPROACHES TO DOMESTIC
VIOLENCE PROSECUTIONS IN INDIANA
A. Prior Acts of Domestic Violence Are Probative in
Showing a Batterer Committed the Charged
Crime

The Federal Rules of Evidence have recognized that
certain evidence is admissible in sexual abuse cases to
show propensity because its probative value is not
sufficiently outweighed by its prejudicial effect.133 This
Note argues for the same type of exception in prosecuting
batterers. Further supporting this inference is research
suggesting that evidence of prior domestic violence is
more probative in showing that a defendant committed
the crime than it is in sexual assault cases because the
recidivism rate of domestic violence batterers is higher
than that of sexual abuse offenders.134
This is also evidenced by the cyclical nature of
abuse. Despite underreporting, data collected reveals that
domestic violence defendants have a high rate of
recidivism and, over time, domestic violence often
becomes more frequent and severe.135 The National
Violence Against Women Survey found that nearly 70% of
women who had been assaulted by an intimate partner

See id. (“Often, past victims have invested a significant amount of
time and effort in leaving the defendant and disengaging from their
emotional and financial grip, and thus are unwilling to voluntarily
insert themselves in the defendant’s criminal proceeding.”).
132 See id.
133 See generally Part II, Section B.
134 See Pamela Vartabedian, The Need to Hold Batterers Accountable:
Admitting Prior Acts of Abuse in Cases of Domestic Violence, 47
SANTA CLARA L. REV. 157, 180 (2007).
135 See Part I, Section C.
131
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reported that their victimization lasted more than one
year.136 For more than a quarter of the women, the
victimization occurred over more than five years, and the
average duration of the violence was four and a half
years.137
Even the language used to describe the experience
of abuse reflects its cyclical, ongoing nature. We say that
a woman who has been assaulted by her husband has
been “battered” or has been subjected to “domestic” or
“intimate partner violence,” suggesting a general status.
In contrast, when a person has been assaulted by a
stranger or casual acquaintance, we say they have been
“assaulted” or gotten into a “fight,” suggesting a one-time
act of violence, not a continued phenomenon.
Lastly, notable work has been done evaluating
batterers’ profiles.138 One expert phrased incidents of
violence as “instrumental” rather than “expressive.”139 By
this, the expert wants society to understand that “the
violent episodes are not simply unconnected episodes of
rage, loss of control, or an inability to manage anger (as
batterers would like us to believe), but rather that the
violence is a calculated, purposeful way to control the life
of an intimate partner.”140 This “system of control” makes
the propensity inference precisely appropriate in these
unique crimes.141 Additional studies have shown that once
a batterer has established a pattern of violence against an
intimate partner, he is likely to continue “unless there is
some intervention, such as criminal justice sanctions
and/or treatment.”142
Meanwhile, the current criminal law used to
prosecute abusers continues to punish only individual
incidents of threatening or violent behavior without
opportunity for victims to testify to the context in which
the charges occurred, ignoring the very nature of the
crime itself.

See NVAWS, supra note 27, at 39.
Id.
138 See Lisa Marie De Sanctis, Bridging the Gap Between the Rules of
Evidence and Justice for Victims of Domestic Violence, 8 YALE J.L. &
FEMINISM 359, 388 (1996).
139 Id.
140 Id.
141 Id.
142 Id.; see also IPAC, supra note 87.
136
137
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B. Prior Acts of Domestic Violence Will Help Jurors
Evaluate Victim Credibility and Eliminate Juror
Bias
Domestic violence cases are also difficult to
prosecute because of the perceived lack of credibility of
women as witnesses. The jury (or a judge) makes all
decisions about the credibility of the witnesses and
evidence. Yet women, who make up the majority of
domestic violence victims, are often seen as “less credible”
witnesses in the criminal justice system.143
Further, these bars on evidence leave jurors in
domestic violence cases with an inadequate basis for
understanding the full, relevant history of abuse by a
defendant. This is not to say such history would be
dispositive of the charged case, but such history is
essential to placing the charged case within an
appropriate context.144 “When a single act of violence is
viewed outside of the broader pattern of abuse in which it
occurred, jurors lack the context necessary for
determining credibility and truth.”145 “They may treat the
case with apathy if they assume that a relatively minor
confrontation was an isolated incident in an otherwise
nonviolent relationship.”146 Jurors may write off the case
as an intoxicated disagreement or as an act of self-defense
against an out-of-control wife or girlfriend.147 When jurors
are shielded from the dynamics between a victim and the
defendant in their intimate relationship, a victim’s
allegations may sound irrational or even farfetched.148
In Indiana, we have already acknowledged that a
reasonable juror might understandably desire access to
evidence relevant to a criminal defendant’s relationship to
his victim or for purposes of motive, intent, or absence of
mistake. Such jurors effectively recognize—and are

See Lynn Hecht Schafran, Credibility in the Courts: Why Is There a
Gender Gap, 34 THE JUDGES J. 5, 5 (1995).
144 See Alafair S. Burke, Domestic Violence as a Crime of Pattern and
Intent: An Alternative Reconceptualization, 75 GEO. WASH. L. REV.
552, 573 (2007); see also Tuerkheimer, supra note 38 at 980–88.
145 Burke, supra note 144.
146 Id. at 574.
147 Id.
148 Id.
143
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instructed by the trial court—that the defendant must
ultimately be proven guilty beyond a reasonable doubt of
the charged offense.
C. Defendants’ Rights Remain Protected
The most compelling argument against the
expansion of 404(b) and the admissibility of prior acts in
domestic violence cases is the same argument that has
opposed the overall admission of character evidence—it
would impair defendants’ right to a fair trial.
Determining the admissibility of other acts
evidence in Indiana requires several levels of analysis. To
admit this evidence, the court must determine that: (1)
the evidence of other crimes, wrongs, or acts is relevant to
a matter at issue, other than the defendant’s propensity
to commit the charged act; (2) the proponent has
sufficient proof that the person who allegedly committed
the act did, in fact, commit the act; and (3) the court must
balance the probative value of the evidence against its
prejudicial effect pursuant to Rule 403.149 There must be
sufficient proof from which a reasonable jury could find
the uncharged conduct proven by a preponderance of the
evidence.150 Direct evidence that the defendant
perpetrated the similar act is not required; rather,
substantial circumstantial evidence of probative value is
sufficient.151
Under a domestic violence exception, the inquiry
would still require levels of analysis. In the hearing for a
prosecutor’s motion to admit other acts evidence, the
judge will first ensure that the evidence is relevant under
Rule 401, and therefore generally admissible under Rule
402. Assuming relevancy, the judge will next decide
whether there are reasons to exclude the relevant prior
acts evidence. This balancing analysis under Rule 403
gives judges the discretion to exclude evidence of prior
acts if its probative value is substantially outweighed by
any prejudice it would cause the defendant. Additional

Camm v. State, 908 N.E.2d 215, 223 (Ind. 2009); see also Caldwell
v. State, 43 N.E.3d 258, 264 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015).
150 Caldwell, 43 N.E.3d at 264.
151 Id.
149
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restraints in the form of notice requirements, discovery
rules, and limiting instructions remain mandatory.
Protecting defendants’ constitutional right to a fair
trial is an essential and proper part of our criminal justice
system codified in the Sixth Amendment. The expansion
of the admissibility of prior acts of domestic abuse would
not hinder this right. Just as the Federal Rules and other
states have successfully codified, this proposal provides
courts discretionary power to exclude any evidence found
too prejudicial to the defendant—and the trial judge is
granted tremendous deference in such situations.
D. Time and Efficiency Concerns
Critics of exceptions discussed in Part II cited time
and efficiency as reasons to oppose those rules and are
likely to have the same concerns here. The problem of
“mini-trials” is often cited by critics.152 They argue that
each admitted uncharged act will result in a trial within a
trial due to the lesser standard of proof for admitting
prior acts evidence.153 By consequence the proceeding is
prolonged, and the defendant is required to defend their
entire past, rather than the charged crime. “Defendants
will likely argue that they did not commit the [prior] acts.
This, of course, is their right, and they should be given
adequate time to respond” to any admissible evidence in a
proceeding,154 which is specifically protected by Rule 404
notice requirements.
These concerns are also abated by the showing
required to admit such evidence.155 Moreover, it is
important to note that it is only uncharged acts of
domestic violence which have been admitted under these
rules,156 and they do not supersede Rule 609.157 Critics
further suggest that the admission of this type of evidence
De Sanctis, supra note 138, at 392.
Id.
154 Id.
155 See generally Part III, Section C.
156 De Sanctis, supra note 138, at 392–93.
157 Rule 609 provides for limits in admitting evidence of a defendants’
prior criminal convictions (for impeachment purposes). FED. R. EVID.
609.
152
153
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confuses juries about the charged crime(s).158 Due to the
low reporting of these crimes, the low cooperation rate of
victims, and the often lacking corroborating evidence, it is
highly unlikely that any one defendant will have many, if
any, prior acts to defend against, even if they have been
batterers throughout their life.159 Further, it undermines
the entirety of these rules to argue that such evidence
“wastes time.”160
E. Necessity as a Matter of Policy
Domestic violence is a societal problem; it is not
just two people in a private relationship working out their
“family problems.”161 The harm caused by this violence
impacts everyone—children, neighbors, extended family,
coworkers, hospital emergency staff, and law
enforcement.162 The state’s interest in maintaining public
safety means ensuring that batterers are not allowed to
remain unabated.163 When prosecutors pursue these
charges and secure meaningful conviction, they reinforce
that domestic violence is unacceptable criminal conduct in
our society.164
Children are secondary victims often dropped from
this discussion. Each year, between three and ten million
children witness one parent abusing or killing the
other.165 Many are injured while trying to protect a
parent, or are used as pawns or shields in abusive
relationships.166 Children are born with birth defects
because their mothers were battered during pregnancy.167
Studies reveal that a child's exposure to the father
abusing the mother is a risk factor for transmitting

De Sanctis, supra note 138, at 392.
Id. at 393.
160 Id. at 392–93.
161 Donna Wills, Domestic Violence: The Case for Aggressive
Prosecution, 7 UCLA WOMEN'S L.J. 173, 174 (1997).
162 See id.
163 See id.
164 See id.; see also IPAC, supra note 87.
165 Wills, supra note 161, at 175.
166 See id.
167 See id.
158
159
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violent behavior from one generation to the next.168 In
Indiana, 63% of juveniles serving time in jail for murder
are there for killing an abusive father, step-father, or
mother's live-in boyfriend in an attempt to protect their
mother.169
Shockingly, dating violence and abuse can start by
age eleven, according to a study that included sexual
assault, physical, emotional, and verbal abuse.170 In fact,
one in five of thirteen- to fourteen-year-olds in
relationships reported they know friends and peers who
have been struck in anger by a boyfriend or girlfriend.171
Further, the pattern of repeated abuse makes
domestic violence calls particularly dangerous for law
enforcement. Because victims of domestic violence
typically wait to call police until after repeated assaults,
officers are in an even more dangerous situation when
they do respond.172 In 2017, more officers were shot
responding to domestic violence than any other type of
firearm-related fatality.173
Lastly, “batterers are ‘master manipulators.’”174
They will do anything to convince their victims to get the
prosecution to drop the charges or secure their victims’
unavailability through coercive and controlling means. In
my job, I could daily listen to inmates’ calls to their
victims where abusers’ pleas range from threatening

IPAC, supra note 87.
Id.
170 Liz Claiborne Inc., Tween and Teen Dating Violence and Abuse
Study, Teenage Research Unlimited (2008), available at
https://www.haven-oakland.org/assets/media/pdf/tru-tween-teenstudy-feb-081.pdf.
171 Id.
172 Deadly Calls and Fatal Encounters, NAT’L LAW ENFORCEMENT
OFFICERS MEMORIAL FUND (herein “NLEOMF”), available at
http://www.nleomf.org/programs/cops/cops-report.html (a five-year
study from 2010-2014 analyzing 684 line-of-duty deaths) (last visited
Oct. 18, 2018).
173 Natalie Schreyer, Domestic Abusers: Dangerous for Women—and
Lethal for Cops, USA TODAY (April 9, 2018) (citing NLEOMF),
available at
https://www.usatoday.com/story/news/nation/2018/04/09/domesticabusers-dangerous-women-and-lethal-cops/479241002/.
174 Wills, supra note 161, at 179.
168
169
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retaliation to sweet-talking with promises of reform. I
have heard the coordination with abusers’ family
members to threaten victims. Abusers have secured
alternative-living arrangements for their victims with
family members who could keep watch. They convince
victims to leave town, so they can ignore subpoenas. They
warn for the loss of the family income, and therefore, the
ability to care for children. They plan exactly what the
victim will say in her recantation. If the case, nonetheless,
makes it to trial, their lawyers then try to convince the
judge or jury that the whole thing was the victim's fault,
that she attacked him, or that she is just “crazy.”
“Prosecutors watch with practiced patience as these
vulnerable victims succumb to their batterers'
intimidation and manipulation.”175 To fill the gap between
the criminal law and the realities of domestic violence, we
must devise rules of evidence that prosecutors in this
distinct situation can work with.
CONCLUSION
Domestic violence creates a unique type of
prosecution where physical evidence may be lacking and
the victim often recants, refuses to cooperate, or is made
unavailable. Difficult prosecutions can be linked to an
increase in the already-disturbing domestic violence
statistics. Amending Rule 404 to admit prior acts evidence
in domestic violence prosecutions allows finders of fact to
consider past acts to provide context to the controlling and
cyclical nature of an abusive relationship—and to show a
propensity to batter. Enacting such a rule provides a
lifeline to prosecutors facing abundant obstacles in
domestic violence cases while safeguarding defendants’
rights in a manner consistent with the Constitution. This
proposal is not a novel idea. Other states have created
exceptions of their own. The next logical step for Indiana
(and other states) is to adopt a rule similar to the
described.
Before closing, I want to turn to the broader and
more fundamental problem that reformers face in trying
to achieve progress—when both sides reveal disturbing
truths. On one side, we see under-reporting, under-
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enforcement, and inadequacy of punishment in domestic
violence prosecutions that lead to conviction. All that is
true and exists to an alarming degree. But, as proponents
for this type of legislation, we must be equally willing to
acknowledge the opposing dynamic that exists side-byside with that neglect—a criminal justice system plagued
by race bias and class bias in enforcement, an inadequate
prison system, and rigidity and disproportionality in
punishment.176 The challenge for successful reform is to
find ways we can maintain and strengthen our
commitment to fairness, while also giving victims the
protection they need from violence so prevalent in the
world today.177
Nonetheless, these truths, coupled with the
continual and escalatory nature of domestic violence, all
occurring within the contours of a society where women
are still unequal and the overwhelming majority of
victims of these crimes, makes domestic violence a
decisive candidate for a categorical exception to the
general prohibition on the admissibility of prior acts
evidence in criminal prosecutions.
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